


## Variations on Three Themes

The word "counterpoint" is defined by Webster as being "the art of plural melody, that is, of melody not single, but moving attended by one or more related but independent melodies." This is the art which economic historian W. W. Rostow practices in delineating the shape of American history in *The United States in the World Arena*, published last month by Harper and Brothers.

Three themes run through Mr. Rostow's 552-page "essay in recent history": the concepts of the national style, the national interest, and the stages of economic growth. The book is a product of a Carnegie-supported program of research in American studies at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology's Center for International Studies.

The bulk of the book is a history and analysis of American foreign and military policy in the years 1940-1958. This account is of value to everyone wanting a detailed record of the American response to the impact of World War II and the challenges of the post-War era. But its deeper significance lies in its illumination of the ways in which our traditional national style and concepts of the national interest are inadequate for the world of 1960.


### *The National Style*

 Nations, like individuals, have a style: a certain recognizable way or manner of doing things. What is the American national style, and how did it evolve?

It assumed its definitive shape in the period from about 1815 to 1900, according to Professor Rostow, although

naturally much of its essential character was formed in colonial days and during the Revolutionary era. The Founding Fathers were theoreticians to rank with the best, but that particular philosophical bent has not been a hallmark of their descendants. Instead, circumstances of geography, economics, and daily life in this country made the typical American an extreme empiricist and pragmatist, untheoretical and non-abstract in his thinking. Oliver Wendell Holmes said "The life of the law has not been logic; it has been experience." This sentence, says Rostow, is more descriptive of the American style than merely of the law.

There was another reason for the development of the particular national style. The U. S. environment of the nineteenth century inevitably produced individualism, materialism, and hardheaded practicality among the citizenry. But the nation was founded on explicit commitment to certain ideal national goals: a creed as enunciated




in the Declaration of Independence, and an agreed political procedure as set forth in the Constitution. It was, in fact, these ideal national goals which unified a society which would otherwise have been fragmented by acute individualism, regionalism, and race. There were bound to be, however, disparities between the goals as they were enunciated and life as it was lived. The Americans handled this dilemma or dualism which was a built-in part of American nationhood by evolving a style "marked by the ritualistic articulation of moral purposes and goals as if they reflected somewhat more of total reality than they did, combined with sensitive and subtle systems of compromise which were institutionalized where possible but remained largely unarticulated."

In their national life as in their individual lives, Americans tended to solve problems in an *ad hoc* manner, on the basis of experience and what amounted almost to intuition. They "flew by the seat of their pants," responding to crisis when it arose as well and flexibly as they could, but failing to develop a theoretical framework within which to act or, indeed, to assess their long-term interests in any coherent way. There were innovation and experimentation, to be sure, but these, Professor Rostow points out, generally took the form of "a sequence of relatively minor, piecemeal, compromise adaptations of a stable basic structure."

This system, if it can be called that, worked with remarkable success during the nineteenth century, when most of the problems Americans faced were domestic rather than foreign. But its success, Dr. Rostow points out, is dependent on two conditions. One is that the problems to be confronted must be essentially familiar, and soluble by innovation that is only mildly radical. The other is that time is required—time in which to experiment and explore possible solutions. Summed up, "the American style which emerged from the nineteenth century was least effective when it confronted issues which required prompt and radical innovation."

This held portents for the twentieth century. The national style did acquire some degree of maturity and sophistication during the first part of that tumultuous century, but when the nation finally turned in 1940 to deal with Hitler and the Japanese, it still "did so in ways resonant with the nation's past."

### *The National Interest*


 American conceptions of the national interest have also reflected the confusion attendant upon the dualism inherent in the American experiment. Americans have generally failed to reconcile their romantic, almost naive, view of the American world mission and moral purpose with the realities of power politics as they were

played not only by other world powers but by the U. S. itself.

Traditionally, the main objectives of U. S. foreign policy were to establish and consolidate an independent continent-nation, and to protect its position in the Western Hemisphere. Shielded by two oceans, and harking back to Washington's often misunderstood but always cited Farewell Address, Americans were able to claim their isolationism as a moral virtue at the same time that they "exploited the major power conflicts of Europe in order to advance direct American interests."

It was not until the twentieth century that it became evident that the oceans—and the friendly British Navy—were not enough to shield the U. S. from acting directly on the international stage. In 1917, with both its ideology and its practical interests threatened, the U. S. threw itself into the balance in a convulsive, all-or-nothing effort. It failed to understand the real implications of that war, however, until the unmistakable challenge of the Germans and the Japanese years later drew it into the center of the world arena once and for all.

### *The National Style and Interest in 1960*

 Today there is no dominant segment of the American population which believes that traditional isolationism is either possible or desirable. But is our current conception of the national interest, broadened as it is over what it was a mere 20 years ago, valid as we move into the seventh decade of the twentieth century? Can we achieve a meaningful synthesis of moral principle and power realities? What changes in our national style are required to accomplish this?

These are the questions Mr. Rostow tackles in the last "book" of his book. He assesses the world, and the U. S. position in it, within the frame of his concept of the five stages of economic growth. (For a description of this concept see "Man with an Idea," page 7.) Briefly, because various nations of the world are reaching more advanced stages of economic growth, we shall see in the near future a diffusion rather than centralization of power, military and political as well as economic. And the United States, which long ago reached the most advanced stage of economic growth, faces new choices as to how it will use its power.

At the moment, the United States, as the major power of the Free World, must devise measures short of war which are effective to meet the military and ideological challenges of the Soviet Union. At the same time, it must deal imaginatively and helpfully with the processes of change within the traditional societies of Asia, the Middle East, Africa, and Latin America.

What this means is that the U. S. must do well and regularly "things which it has done in the past only compulsively at moments of acute and palpable crisis." It must do this while protecting so far as possible the quality of its domestic life, the social and political processes which it holds dear. All of this requires that the U. S. "shift the balance of its common life in moral, philosophic, administrative, political, and economic dimensions. The national interest cannot be defined, projected, or acted on effectively without a reassessment of the place of moral purpose in American public policy; the problem of anticipation and of pace in innovation cannot be solved without change in American philosophical, administrative, and political method; the mobilization of resources to do the jobs that must be done requires change in American economic thought and practice."

### *Moral Purpose in Public Policy*

★★ Not since the Civil War has our method of dealing with the problem of public morality been under such sustained pressure, but there has been for our generation no Lincoln to pose clearly "the nature of the nation's moral dilemma and the inescapable problem of balance and relationship between national interests of power and ideology."

Mr. Rostow points out that Communism poses two distinct, yet subtly related, threats to the national interest: a direct threat to the nation's physical security, and an ideological threat with implications not only for that security but for the nation's survival as a free society. The nature of today's world denies us the possibility of reacting to national threat in the traditional style, "a clean and total switch from peace to a war which could be fought with the widespread conviction that both interests and ideals neatly overlapped." Instead we must act on two fronts, effecting a reconciliation between our moral purpose and the realistic but restrained exercise of our political, economic, and military power.

We must not relinquish but reaffirm our world democratic mission, realizing the while that our national interest does not require that other nations accept our exact forms or institutions of democracy, and understanding that movement in the direction of democracy, rather than full arrival there, is the most that can be expected of any nation at this stage of history.

We must forestall direct Soviet aggression as well as block its ideological conquest of other parts of the world. Yet the techniques and attitudes of mind necessary to deal with the threat of military aggression often are in conflict with those necessary to meet the ideological threat. Finally, we must learn to "sustain simultaneously the conception of

mortal enemy and potential fellow citizen of a crowded and increasingly interdependent planet," using our power to thwart Soviet expansion while we continue to negotiate with the Soviet government and seek wider sympathy and understanding with the Soviet people.

### *Changes in Style*



The challenges posed not only by the Soviet Union but by rising nationalist aspirations in other parts of the world require that the U. S. develop the capacity to innovate with much greater speed, and in more dramatic depth, than has been its custom.

Intellectually, this means that it must place a higher premium on the worth of the theoretician, that it must strive to develop a generation accustomed to thinking in terms of long trends and to anticipating problems before they arise.

Bureaucratically, it means that the U. S. must inspect closely the vaunted American ability at administration, and ask whether our emphasis on the committee method, compromise, and *ad hoc* decision-making on the basis of past experience actually serves us well today.

Politically, it means that we must reassess the meaning of leadership in a democracy, and investigate the channels through which the public is informed in clear terms of the nature of the nation's problems and the alternatives open to it. In this function the role of the President is or should be pre-eminent, but other individuals and organizations have large parts to play.

Finally, we must reassess our ideas about the national economy in the light of the kind of world we want to see, and ask whether our present allocation of national funds—largely to mass private domestic consumption—will help to create that kind of world.

The definition of moral purpose, the needed changes in accustomed style, the restraint and sacrifice necessary to make different allocations of the national product—all these place strong yet subtle demands on the intelligence, will, and spirit of a free people. But as Mr. Rostow points out, although the U. S. should free itself of much in its old style and performance, there is at least one strand from its past which it should cherish and continue to develop—the capacity to throw itself into solving problems with energy, zest, and confidence.

"The United States, child of the Enlightenment, favored adolescent of the nineteenth century, powerful but erratic youth of the first half of the twentieth, must now confirm its maturity by acting from the present forward to see the values of the Enlightenment—or their equivalents in non-Western cultures—survive and dominate in the twenty-first."



# The Overseas Americans

Almost 1 per cent of all American citizens now live and work abroad, a percentage which might not seem large until you realize that in numbers it represents about 1,600,000 people. This figure does not include tourists or Americans overseas on very short term assignments. It does include military and civilian employees of the government, businessmen, missionaries, representatives of voluntary and philanthropic organizations—and their wives and children. The number is not likely to grow smaller.

Old and young, competent and incompetent, arrogant and humble, these Americans—at least the men and employed women—are where they are to do a job. They are also, whether they or we like it or not, seen as representatives of the United States by the foreign nationals among whom they live and work.

It is hard enough to recruit the right man for the right job here at home. To tap and train the right men for jobs overseas adds questions which, if they are not imponderables, at least have not been pondered in any very systematic way to date. What qualities of mind and spirit does the effective American possess? What can be added to his early education and his immediate training for overseas service to enhance his effectiveness?

For several years a group at Syracuse University's Maxwell School of Citizenship and Public Affairs, headed by Dean Harlan Cleveland, has been seeking some of the answers to these questions. One result of the Carnegie-sponsored program will appear late next month as a book published by the McGraw-Hill Book Company. *The*

*Overseas Americans*, by Mr. Cleveland, Gerard J. Mangone, and John Clarke Adams, reports the results of interviews with several hundred American civilians overseas and the foreigners with whom they deal, describes the kinds of education for overseas service now available in the United States, and contains recommendations for future action.

## *The U. S. Image Abroad*

One myth which should be dispelled at the outset is that the striking signs of American unpopularity abroad are all due to the behavior of Americans overseas. This is too easy a way for Americans at home to evade their own responsibility for the foreign image of the United States. "The overseas Americans carry with them not only the responsibility for their own behavior but also the guilt for any intolerance in Arkansas or bumbling in Washington. . . . Businessmen or missionaries, airmen or soldiers, spies, experts, or diplomats, they are all, like it or not, surrogates for the United States Secretary of State."

Granting that the overseas Americans are not the reason why foreign mobs occasionally trample the Stars and Stripes or stone the U. S. Embassy, and also granting that it is impossible to generalize about the performance of hundreds of thousands of people, nonetheless there is evidence of unsatisfactory American performance overseas. Figures are hard to come by, but some agencies and businesses estimate that up to 25 per cent of their employees are so poorly fit for overseas service that they actually have to be sent packing back to the States. Many

more are not so dramatically maladjusted but still fall far short of effective performance.

What is it about the prior education and experience of an American that turns out to be truly relevant to his effective performance abroad? The Syracuse group describes five qualities which mark the effective "overseas-man," whether he be in public or private service.

The first, which seems terribly obvious but apparently is not, is that he should possess an adaptable technical skill. A vague desire to do good or "work overseas" is a singularly poor criterion for hiring a man. "Don't send me a specialist on West Africa who is curious about the oil business," pleaded the manager of a large American marketing firm in Dakar. "Send me an oil man who is curious about West Africa."

Actually, an American working overseas needs greater technical skill than he would at home because he has no one to turn to in trouble and because the conditions under which he works require him to improvise—not only to do what he himself has never



done before, but to invent workways that have never before been used anywhere. Yet Mr. Cleveland and his colleagues are convinced that many of the Americans sent abroad are not more but *less* competent than would be tolerated in the U. S.

The second important qualification is, perhaps unfortunately, labeled "belief in mission." This is not meant to connote the belief that the U. S. has a "civilizing" mission abroad, or a "Take up the white man's burden" attitude, but simply a man's attitude toward his job, no matter where it is. He has to like what he is doing and believe it is worth doing. If he is a bridge builder, it means he likes and takes pride in the job of building a bridge, whether it be across the Golden Gate or a turbulent stream in Peru.

### *Cultural Empathy*

The third quality is the inevitable "cultural empathy," which Mr. Cleveland defines as "the skill to understand the logic and inner coherence of other ways, plus the restraint not to judge them as bad just because they are different from one's own ways." Cultural empathy requires that a man attain a certain involvement in foreign ways without "going native."

This is the quality which Americans need most to strain to develop, and one which it is very difficult for them to come by. Americans think of themselves as generally fast-moving, direct, practical, and impatient. Some are driven almost literally crazy by traditions, rituals, and general slowness which block what they believe to be needed change. As Mr. Cleveland and his colleagues point out, Americans are near one end of the world spectrum with respect to their attitudes toward time, manners, social equality, respect for the dignity of labor, etc. No matter where they go abroad, their adjustment will generally be all in the same direction—toward slowing down in general, greater formality in social re-

lations, developing understanding and respect for traditions and customs which seem to them bars to progress.


The fourth quality which a good overseasman needs to develop is a sense of politics. This requires "intuitive imagination."

The American abroad is "perforce a political animal, whether he realizes it or not," says Mr. Cleveland. He is conspicuous "by his green passport and the fact that he is taller, lighter-skinned, better-dressed, and richer than the people around him." What he needs to acquire is "a modest recognition of his alien status, a willingness to take account of dynamic political forces that mold whatever he has been sent to do, and a sense of his responsibility as representative of the United States and his organization."

Acquiring a sense for political trends and forces abroad means that the American must make an imaginative attempt to understand customs and standards of political behavior and even honesty which are different from those at home. He must learn to think of himself as a factor in the rapidly changing "power structure" around him—and must therefore develop the skill to recognize the symbols and analyze the cross-currents in an unfamiliar system of social authority.

### *Institution Builders*

Finally, the effective performer abroad needs organization ability. This is more than the talent for survival in a large organization, which every American learns to some extent. The overseas American is operating far from home under alien conditions, and the knotty problems of any headquarters-field relationship are multiplied by distance and compounded by cross-cultural misunderstanding. Beyond this, a special flair for institution-building is, the authors think, a must for nearly all Americans abroad in responsible jobs. They need to learn how to organize schools, companies, agri-



cultural extension services, churches, clubs, and government agencies—not transplanting, not saying "Back home in Louisiana we do it this way," but fashioning institutions to perform familiar functions out of exotic cultural raw materials.

If these five qualities identify a good overseasman, how can they be identified in advance? There is, unfortunately, no personality or other test which will reveal them with certainty. In recruiting for overseas service, say Messrs. Cleveland et al., "nothing is likely to replace an interview—except a longer interview or multiple interviews."

What should the interviewer look for? In assessing personality, he should look for very resourceful, buoyant people, resilient types who bounce back quickly after disappointment and frustration, operators who are ingenious and flexible.

As for background, people who early in life had the opportunity to rub shoulders with all kinds of people show better adaptability to strange environments later in life.

In education, look for breadth of learning and for evidences of intellectual curiosity beyond the call of academic duty.

As for experience, look (in addition to specific technical skills) for signs of a talent for building institutions.

Some of these qualities we might (loosely and inaccurately) call "in-

born." At any rate, a person who simply is not temperamentally buoyant and resilient cannot be taught to be. But other things *can* be learned—an ability to analyze power structures and to see oneself as a "political" man; a knowledge of foreign cultures and languages as well as of American civilization (an important requirement for the American overseas); the restraint necessary to tolerate frustrations; and a taste for institution-building.

What implications does all this hold for our educational system? Plenty, according to the Syracuse group. They claim that it is up to every college and university to look upon every student as a potential overseasman, and they see preparation for overseas service as a four-part educational sequence.

### *Education for Service*

The American preparing for overseas service should first acquire a real liberal arts education with study of foreign cultures and languages; next he should acquire professional training in a subject matter field, such as law, medicine, economics, engineering, agriculture, public administration, etc.; then special linguistic skills and area knowledge which will be relevant to his first overseas assignment; and then some immediate orientation to the particular job to be done abroad.

If such opportunities are to be made available, all institutions of higher education will be affected, from liberal arts colleges to universities to graduate and professional schools. As a matter of fact, "taken all in all, the better American college classrooms are becoming windows on the world," says the Syracuse group. Nonetheless much remains to be done.

Mr. Cleveland and his associates say that the certain qualities of mind and spirit that are particularly associated with effective performance overseas are generally applicable regardless of the kind of work the American is doing or in what foreign country he

is doing it. This leads them to certain suggestions about the kinds of educational opportunities which should be available.

### *Study Abroad*

Immersion in an alien culture is central to an overseas training program, and should be an important element in the internationalization of higher education in the U. S. "It should be a live option of every student at a reputable American college to study abroad for at least one semester under competent supervision and conditions that immerse him in an alien culture."

University area study programs should be expanded to add a third element to the two they traditionally contain. At present they are responsible for producing a few highly trained area "experts," and for giving orientation and short-term training in the culture, language, history, geography, politics, and institutions of a country in which an individual is about to undertake a job in his own vocational field. They should also organize their facilities in such a way as to immerse a prospective overseasman in the lore and language of one country, not to make him expert on that country but to illustrate the transferability to other countries of what has been learned and of the method used to learn it.

Every professional school and graduate program in the social sciences should reflect in its curriculum the certainty that some of its students will practice their profession abroad.

An overseas training program should stress the comparative study of the political and administrative processes.

Every overseas American should learn to think about his own country as a whole, to take "delight in its pluralism and savor the contradictions in its heritage."

The Syracuse group believes the problem is serious enough to call for a coordinating device at the govern-

ment level, for "in the absence of a serious attack on the whole problem of education for overseas service, a frustrated sense of urgency inevitably produces a good deal of enthusiasm for specialized panaceas." (The often-suggested Foreign Service Academy is cited, and discarded, as an example.) Thus they suggest that Congress might establish, within the Executive Branch, on the model of the National Science Foundation, a "National Foundation for Overseas Service," which would act as a coordinating research center and assist scholarly publications in the field; develop and dramatize a nationwide attack on the problem of educating and training Americans for overseas life; and distribute government financial assistance to encourage programs in the field.

### *Collective Performance*

Despite their faith in the improvements that can be made in preparing Americans for overseas service, the authors close by reminding us again that no matter how effective the individual performances of Americans may be in overseas work, their success will be deeply affected by the foreign and domestic policies chosen by the United States while they are abroad. Individual performance can be much improved, but the collective performance of Americans overseas is unlikely to be better than Main Street and Pennsylvania Avenue permit.





# Man With an Idea

When Walt Whitman Rostow was an 18-year-old history major at Yale he participated in a "black market" seminar which changed the course of his life. Yale did not then offer courses in modern economic theory, so Rostow and three other undergraduates met in evening seminars under Richard M. Bissell—seminars which led Rostow to decide to apply economic theory to the study of economic history and also, by the by, to try to develop an alternative to Karl Marx's theory of history.

Twenty-four years passed and Rostow, having occupied himself in the meantime with military and civilian government service and the attainment of a professorship at M.I.T., had still not uttered a public word on Marx, although he had been giving him plenty of thought. By last year his thoughts had jelled, and in a series of lectures at Cambridge (England) he described his theory of the five stages of national economic growth. The lectures caused immediate and lively interest and debate. *The Economist* published a series on them; excerpts were published in the press and journals of a score of countries all over the world; supporting arguments as well as counter arguments appeared. This month, Cambridge University Press published *The Stages of Economic Growth* simultaneously in this country and the United Kingdom, in both hard and paper cover editions.

Last spring Mr. Rostow was presented with an opportunity to air his views before a most unusual, although highly appropriate, forum: the Soviet Institute of World Economy and International Relations in Moscow. Rostow arrived in Moscow on a Saturday and was casually informed by his hosts that he was to deliver a lecture

on Monday morning—a speech which should, at his hosts' request, deal with his theory as related to peaceful co-existence and the under-developed areas.

Facing a group of distinguished Soviet social scientists, Mr. Rostow explained his theory of the five stages of economic growth. First is the traditional, largely agricultural, stage. Only a few societies, such as some in Africa, fall in this category today.

## *The "Take-Off"*

Next the society attains the preconditions for take-off: improved agricultural methods release more of the population from agrarian pursuits, modern techniques are applied to the processing of some natural resource for export, and outlays are made for transport, education, and sources of power.

Then comes the period of take-off: rapid growth is made in a limited number of key sectors of the economy—it was textiles for Great Britain, railroads for the U. S., France, Germany, Canada, and Russia. At this stage, growth becomes self-sustained; investment rises and remains sufficient to make an increase in output per capita a regular condition.

After the take-off comes the drive to maturity: other sectors of the economy are developed to supplant the older leading sectors. The society effectively applies the range of available technology to the bulk of its resources.

When the society arrives at technological maturity, it then faces choices as to how it shall use its mature industrial machine. It can go in the direction of providing greater social security and leisure; or it can expand its power on the world scene; or it can go

toward high mass consumption. The U. S. has by and large opted for high mass consumption; Germany, on the other hand, twice succumbed to the temptation of pressing for world power.

The U.S.S.R., Mr. Rostow pointed out to his Soviet hosts, has now arrived at this period of choice. He also emphasized that at every stage societies are confronted with basic choices of policy and of value which transcend economic analysis. "The stages of growth are not a set of rigid, inevitable, predetermined phases of history. The process of growth poses for men and societies certain problems and possibilities from which they must choose, and modern history can be viewed as the consequences of choices made by various societies at various stages of growth."

With respect to the underdeveloped areas of the world, Mr. Rostow challenged both the U. S. and the U.S.S.R. to make certain choices about the use of their economic power. If our only objective were to help the new nations into sustained growth, he pointed out, we would execute a joint program in three parts. We would offer the underdeveloped countries ample capital, give them assistance to increase agricultural output, and adopt policies which would encourage local politicians to concentrate on economic development.

Rostow's theory has been attacked from various quarters: from doctrinaire "capitalists" who dispute his belief that sustained growth can occur under different forms of government, to Communists who see (correctly) his concepts as an attack on Marx's theory of history. Rostow is not troubled—in fact he is pleased—by the attacks. He thinks they reflect a desire all over the world, even among young Soviet intellectuals, to have Marxist theory re-examined after 120 years. His theory may not be correct, he acknowledges. But one thing that has been proven, he believes, is that Western social scien-

tists should give more thought to developing alternatives to Marx's theory of history, whether the alternatives they come up with are Rostow's or not.

## Staff News

Stephen H. Stackpole, who is head of the Corporation's program for the Commonwealth, departed last month for a trip to West Africa. He will spend time in Ghana, Nigeria, and Sierra Leone.

Alan Pifer, Executive Associate in the Commonwealth program, has recently returned from a visit to East and Central Africa, as well as the British colony of Basutoland.

## New Grants

Grants amounting to \$3,166,000 were voted during the second quarter of the fiscal year 1959-60, which began October 1, 1959.

The income for the fiscal year 1959-60 is now estimated at \$10,600,000. From this amount, \$900,000 has been set aside to meet commitments, including those for teachers' pensions, incurred in previous years. It is the Corporation's policy to spend all income during the year in which it is received.

Included among the grants voted during the past quarter are those listed below:

### United States

The American Assembly, toward support of the study of national goals, \$100,000.

American Council of Learned Societies, for support of American scholars on visits to the Soviet Union under the U. S.-U.S.S.R. Exchange Agreement, \$50,000.

University of California, for a comparative study of leadership in certain countries of Middle Africa, \$85,000.

University of California, for a study of leadership in the Federation of the West Indies, \$133,000.

University of California, for research on creativity, \$50,000.

University of Chicago, for a research and training program to be conducted by the Committee for the Comparative Study of New Nations, \$350,000.

Church Peace Union, for research on religion and the state in Asia, \$45,000.

Community Studies, Inc., for a study of undergraduate students at the University of Kansas, \$154,000.

College Entrance Examination Board, for a comparative study of university admissions throughout the world, \$250,000.

Council on Foreign Relations, for support of research, regional committees, and fellowships, \$500,000.

Harvard University, for fellowships for college teachers to study at the law school, \$150,000.

Harvard University, toward support of the Defense Policy Seminar, \$75,000.

The Johns Hopkins University, toward support of the research program of the School of Advanced International Studies, \$250,000.

Laval University, for an honors program for U. S. students at its French Summer School, \$10,000.

North Central Association of Colleges and Secondary Schools, for a training program for academic administrators, \$61,000.

Oberlin College, to expand its summer language programs in Austria, France, and Mexico, \$23,650.

Princeton University, for an inter-university study of the role of education and high-level manpower in the modernization process, \$200,000.

University of Rochester, toward support of a Canadian Studies Program, \$135,000.

Southern Regional Education Board, for a training program in the education of gifted children, \$75,000.

Western Michigan University, for a program of studies on the non-Western world, \$144,000.

## Carnegie Corporation of New York Quarterly

APRIL 1960

Published quarterly by Carnegie Corporation of New York, 589 Fifth Avenue, New York 17, N. Y.

Helen Rowan, *Editor*

Each issue of the Quarterly describes only a few of many Carnegie-supported projects in a variety of fields. Full listings of all the Corporation's activities are contained in its annual reports, which usually are published in January.

Carnegie Corporation of New York is a philanthropic foundation created by Andrew Carnegie in 1911 for the advancement and diffusion of knowledge and understanding. It has a basic endowment of \$135 million and its present assets, reckoned at cost value, are approximately \$200 million. The income from \$12 million of this fund may be used in certain British Commonwealth areas; all other income must be spent in the United States.

The Corporation is primarily interested in higher education and in certain aspects of public and international affairs. Grants are made to colleges and universities, professional associations, and other educational organizations for specific programs. In higher education, these include basic research, studies of educational developments, training opportunities for teachers and administrators, and other educational projects of an experimental nature. In public and international affairs, the Corporation is concerned primarily with research and training programs which promise increased understanding of the problems the nation faces and which provide better selection and training of young men and women who must deal with these problems.

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